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Mentalizing, attachment and epistemic trust: how psychotherapy can promote resilience 
 
Over the past decades, meta-analyses have failed to find almost any clinically meaningful 
differences in efficacy between the various evidence-based psychotherapies. This has led to 
the formulation of the so-called “Dodo bird verdict”, based on the Alice in Wonderland story, 
which argues that “all [psychotherapies] have won and all must have prizes”.  
 
Consequently, major figures in the field have questioned the notion that theory-specific 
techniques or interventions, such as addressing dysfunctional cognitions in cognitive-
behavioral therapy, or the relationship between past and present in psychodynamic therapy, 
are mainly responsible for therapeutic outcome. They argue that, instead, factors that are 
common to effective treatments – providing the patient with hope and with a comprehensive 
theory that explains the patient’s complaints – would typically explain a greater proportion of 
the therapeutic outcome. This would be particularly the case if the therapist is able to 
establish a warm and empathic therapeutic relationship with the patient. Hence, the “Dodo 
bird” still looms unresolved over the field of psychotherapy (Budd & Hughes, 2009; Mansell, 
2011).  
 
In this paper, I will attempt to set out a new, evolutionarily informed approach to the “Dodo 
bird” controversy, which we speculate may have implications for understanding 
psychopathology more generally. 
 
Mentalizing and attachment: Evolutionary advantages  
Our starting point is contemporary evolutionary theories concerning social cognition. 
Evolutionary theory suggests that as the human mind needed to respond to ever more 
challenging, complex, and competitive conditions, norms for social behavior and 
understanding could not be “fixed” by genetics or constitution. These norms had to be 
optimized through a prolonged period of development within a close circle of people – people 
who we would term attachment figures. Attachment figures not only provided young children 
with the basis for feelings of security and exploration (Bowlby, 1973; Main, Kaplan, & 
Cassidy, 1985), but also provided a training ground for the ability to mentalize – the capacity 
to understand ourselves and others in terms of intentional mental states (Fonagy & Luyten, 
2016).  
 
Mentalizing provided an evolutionary advantage because it allowed these early humans to 
adapt better to their physical environment, by facilitating social collaboration and well-
functioning kinship groups, but also by supporting competition for survival when different 
social groups were at odds. Hence, mentalizing is a key element of our species’ uniquely 
developed level of social cognition (Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, & Campbell, 2017a, 2017b).  
 
The link between attachment and mentalizing is clear. Attachment contexts provide the ideal 
conditions for fostering mentalizing. Secure attachment relationships, where attachment 
figures are interested in the child’s mind and the child is safe to explore the mind of the 
attachment figure (Fonagy, Lorenzini, Campbell, & Luyten, 2014), allow the infant to 
explore other subjectivities, including that of his/her caregiver. Finding him/herself 
accurately represented in the mind of the caregiver as a thinking and feeling intentional being 
ensures that the infant’s own capacities for mentalizing will develop well (Fonagy, Gergely, 
Jurist, & Target, 2002). 
 
Epistemic trust and the transmission of culture 
Recent elaborations of thinking on mentalizing have taken the argument one step further to 
point to another important function of attachment relationships. This is the development of 
epistemic trust, that is, trust in the authenticity and personal relevance of interpersonally 
transmitted knowledge. Epistemic trust enables social learning in an ever-changing social and 
cultural context and allows individuals to benefit from their (social) environment (Fonagy & 
Allison, 2014; Fonagy & Luyten, 2016; Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2015).  
 
Gergely and Csibra’s theory of natural pedagogy helps to clarify the key issues here (Csibra 
& Gergely, 2006, 2009, 2011). Human beings are faced with a major learnability problem: 
they are born into a world that is populated with objects, attributes, and customs whose 
function or use is epistemically opaque (that is, not obvious from their appearance). Humans 
are thus evolved to both teach and learn new and relevant cultural information rapidly .  
 
Human communication is specifically adapted to allow the transmission of epistemically 
opaque information: the communication of such knowledge is enabled by an epistemically 
trusting relationship. Epistemic trust allows the recipient of the information being conveyed 
to relax their natural, epistemic vigilance – a vigilance that is self-protective and naturally 
occurring because, after all, it is not in our interest to believe everything indiscriminately. 
The relaxation of epistemic vigilance allows us to accept that what we are being told matters 
to us (Sperber et al., 2010; Wilson & Sperber, 2012).  
 
These views do not diminish the importance of attachment, but put theories concerning the 
role of attachment in a very different perspective (Fonagy et al., 2017a, 2017b). Recent 
research suggests that the long-term relationship between attachment in infancy and 
attachment status in adolescence and into adulthood is complex. It seems likely that there is a 
fluctuating relationship between attachment, genes, and the social environment across the life 
course (Ellis, Boyce, Belsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2011; Fearon, 
Shmueli-Goetz, Viding, Fonagy, & Plomin, 2014).   
 
In terms of psychopathology, we suggest that the most significant implication of the 
developmental triad of attachment, mentalization, and epistemic trust lies in the consequences 
of a breakdown in epistemic trust. What we are suggesting here is that many, if not all, types 
of psychopathology might be characterized by temporary or permanent disruption of 
epistemic trust and the social learning process it enables (Fonagy et al., 2015).  
 
An infant whose channels for learning about the social world have been disrupted – in other 
words, whose social experiences with caregivers have caused a breakdown in epistemic trust 
– is left in a quandary of uncertainty and permanent epistemic vigilance. Everybody seeks 
social knowledge, but when such reassurance and input is sought, the content of this 
communication may be rejected, its meaning confused, or it may be misinterpreted as having 
hostile intent. In that sense, many forms of mental disorder might be considered 
manifestations of failings in social communication arising from epistemic mistrust, 
hypervigilance, or outright epistemic freezing, a complete inability to trust others as a source 
of knowledge about the world, which may be characteristic of many individuals with marked 
trauma and personality problems. An individual who was traumatized in childhood, for 
instance, has little reason to trust others and will reject information that is inconsistent with 
their pre-existing beliefs. As therapists, we may consider such people “hard to reach”, yet 
they are simply showing an adaptation to a social environment where information from 
attachment figures was likely to be misleading (Fonagy et al., 2015). 
 
The “p factor”: Epistemic mistrust as a common factor in psychopathology? 
A serious challenge for our thinking about psychopathology arises from the fact that when we 
consider many individuals’ psychiatric history over their life course, it rarely follows the 
discrete, symptom-defined, and diagnosis-led categories that extant cross-sectional research 
uses when conceptualizing specific disorders. 
 
This lack of specificity may relate to compelling evidence presented by Caspi et al. (Caspi et 
al., 2014) suggesting that there is, in fact, a “general psychopathology factor” in the structure 
of psychiatric disorders. Caspi and colleagues’ findings suggest that a hierarchical three-level 
structure explains the relationships among psychiatric disorders:  
 A general psychopathology factor (labelled the “p factor” as a conceptual parallel to 
the “g factor”, the well-established dimension by which general intelligence is 
understood); 
 Clusters of symptoms (internalizing, externalizing, and psychosis); and  
 Individual disorders, for example, schizophrenia, generalized anxiety disorder, and 
depression.  
 
A higher p factor score is associated with increased severity of impairment, more 
developmental adversity, and greater biological risk. The p factor concept convincingly 
explains why, so far, it has proved so difficult to identify isolated causes, consequences, or 
biomarkers and to develop specific, tailored treatments for individual psychiatric disorders. 
The p factor is thus far a statistical construct. We propose that the p factor may be a proxy for 
impairments in epistemic trust: An individual with a high p factor score is one who, because 
of developmental adversity (whether biological or social), is in a state of epistemic 
hypervigilance and epistemic mistrust. If this is true, it may have major consequences for 
psychosocial interventions. It would mean, for instance, that people with relatively low p 
factor scores might be most responsive to psychosocial interventions. A depressed patient 
with a low p factor score may, for instance, recover with the help of brief cognitive-
behavioral therapy or psychodynamic therapy, perhaps even when delivered via an e-
platform. These patients may be relatively “easy to reach” in terms of treatment because they 
are open to social learning in the form of therapeutic intervention. In contrast, a depressed 
patient with a high p factor score, who is suffering from high levels of comorbidity, longer-
term difficulties, and greater impairment, is likely to show intense treatment resistance 
because of their high levels of epistemic mistrust, or outright epistemic freezing. We consider 
it likely that such patients will require more long-term therapy to first stimulate epistemic 
trust and openness. 
 
Epistemic trust as the key to effective psychotherapies 
In proposing that epistemic mistrust might underpin the p factor that underlies long-term 
impairment, we thus also consider that (the relearning of) epistemic trust may be at the heart 
of all effective psychotherapeutic interventions. Put simply, we suggest that effective 
interventions specialize in generating epistemic trust in individuals who struggle to relax 
their epistemic vigilance in more ordinary social situations. Patients with BPD, for example, 
are typically experienced as “rigid” and “hard to reach”, and the difficulties involved in 
stimulating epistemic trust have historically blighted attempts to intervene effectively with 
these individuals. 
 “Psychotherapy” in its many forms thus may simply be a specialized variant of an activity 
that has been part the repertoire of communicative behavior for a very long time – turning to 
others in times of need to make sense of what is happening to us. It is the seeking out of 
perspective and the reassurance of another’s social knowledge. But for it to be meaningful 
there needs to be a workable level of epistemic trust.   
 
The psychotherapeutic communication systems 
Based on the above considerations, we propose that there are three distinct processes of 
communication that cumulatively make psychotherapy effective: 
 Communication System 1: The teaching and learning of content 
The different therapeutic schools belong to this system. They may be effective 
primarily because they involve the therapist conveying to the patient a model for 
understanding the mind that the patient can understand as involving a convincing 
recognition and identification of his/her own state. This may in itself lower the 
patient’s epistemic vigilance. 
 Communication System 2: The re-emergence of robust mentalizing 
When the patient is once again open to social communication in contexts that had 
previously been blighted by epistemic hypervigilance, he/she shows increased interest 
in the therapist’s mind and the therapist’s use of thoughts and feelings, which 
stimulates and strengthens the patient’s capacity for mentalizing. Improvements in 
mentalizing or social cognition may thus be a common factor across different 
interventions. 
 Communication System 3: The re-emergence of social learning 
The relaxation of the patient’s hypervigilance via the first two systems of 
communication enables the patient to become open to social learning. This allows the 
patient to apply his/her new mentalizing and communicative capabilities to wider 
social learning, outside the consulting room. This final part of the process depends 
upon the patient having a sufficiently benign social environment to allow him/her to 
gain the necessary experiences to validate and bolster improved his/her mentalizing, 
and to continue to facilitate relaxation of epistemic mistrust, in the wider social world. 
 
What this view suggests is that the effectiveness of psychotherapies, regardless of their 
“brand names”, should be investigated at the three levels of communication. Furthermore, it 
redirects our attention to the social environment, and to interventions that may directly target 
environmental factors that could contribute to the origin and maintenance of 
psychopathology, but could also have the potential to support recovery and the individual’s 
capacity to benefit from benign aspects of the environment. 
 
Resilience and epistemic trust 
At the core of the thinking set out here is an emphasis on the relationship between the social 
environment as a system and individual differences in the capacity for higher order cognition. 
We argue that resilience or the absence of resilience may be the outcome of the dynamics of 
this relationship.  Understanding the ‘nature of resilience’ we suggest requires engagement at 
the level of the mechanism that channels the relationship between the social layer of 
communication and the individual’s capacity for reorganizing mental processes. Attempts at 
intervention at the level of non-resilient responses, we suggest, can be of limited 
effectiveness: this, we argue, explains, for instance, the clinical unresponsiveness of patients 
with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) features to many traditional psychotherapeutic 
interventions. A further informing principle is that the type of functioning associated with 
many forms of psychopathology might best be understood as an evolutionarily driven form of 
entrenched adaptation to stimuli from the social environment – often in interaction with 
genetic propensity (Belsky et al., 2012) – rather than as a mere deficit. It is this adaptive 
imperative that underpins the enduring quality that is central to definitions of personality 
disorder. The “borderline mind”, and related severe problems with social communication 
typically observed in what we commonly refer to as “personality pathology”, therefore may 
best be understood as a socially triggered outcome, a learned expectation about cultural 
context. In terms of clinical implications, this change in perspective drives a shift in clinical 
focus: beyond the consulting room to the wider social systems that can promote resilience.  
 
Acknowledgements 
Peter Fonagy is in receipt of a National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Senior 
Investigator Award (NF-SI-0514-10157). Peter Fonagy was in part supported by the NIHR 
Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care (CLAHRC) North 
Thames at Barts Health NHS Trust. The views expressed are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health. 
 
References 
Belsky, D. W., Caspi, A., Arseneault, L., Bleidorn, W., Fonagy, P., Goodman, M., . . . 
Moffitt, T. E. (2012). Etiological features of borderline personality related 
characteristics in a birth cohort of 12-year-old children. Development and 
Psychopathology, 24(1), 251-265. doi:10.1017/S0954579411000812 
Bowlby, J. (1973). Attachment and loss, Vol. 2: Separation: Anxiety and anger. London, UK: 
Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis. 
Budd, R., & Hughes, I. (2009). The Dodo Bird Verdict--controversial, inevitable and 
important: A commentary on 30 years of meta-analyses. Clinical Psychology and 
Psychotherapy, 16(6), 510-522. doi:10.1002/cpp.648 
Caspi, A., Houts, R. M., Belsky, D. W., Goldman-Mellor, S. J., Harrington, H., Israel, S., . . . 
Moffitt, T. E. (2014). The p factor: One general psychopathology factor in the 
structure of psychiatric disorders? Clinical Psychological Science, 2(2), 119-137. 
doi:10.1177/2167702613497473 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2006). Social learning and social cognition: The case for 
pedagogy. In M. H. Johnson & Y. Munakata (Eds.), Processes of change in brain and 
cognitive development. Attention and Performance XXI (pp. 249-274). Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2009). Natural pedagogy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 
148-153. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.005 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2011). Natural pedagogy as evolutionary adaptation. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 366(1567), 1149-1157. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0319 
Ellis, B. J., Boyce, W. T., Belsky, J., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & van Ijzendoorn, M. H. 
(2011). Differential susceptibility to the environment: An evolutionary–
neurodevelopmental theory. Development and Psychopathology, 23(1), 7-28. 
doi:10.1017/S0954579410000611 
Fearon, P., Shmueli-Goetz, Y., Viding, E., Fonagy, P., & Plomin, R. (2014). Genetic and 
environmental influences on adolescent attachment. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 55(9), 1033-1041. doi:10.1111/jcpp.12171 
Fonagy, P., & Allison, E. (2014). The role of mentalizing and epistemic trust in the 
therapeutic relationship. Psychotherapy, 51(3), 372-380. doi:10.1037/a0036505 
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E., & Target, M. (2002). Affect regulation, mentalization, and 
the development of the self. New York, NY: Other Press. 
Fonagy, P., Lorenzini, N., Campbell, C., & Luyten, P. (2014). Why are we interested in 
attachments? In P. Holmes & S. Farnfield (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of 
attachment: Theory (pp. 38-51). Hove, UK: Routledge. 
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2016). A multilevel perspective on the development of borderline 
personality disorder. In D. Cicchetti (Ed.), Developmental psychopathology. Vol. 3: 
Risk, disorder, and adaptation (3rd ed., pp. 726-792). New York, NY: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., & Allison, E. (2015). Epistemic petrification and the restoration of 
epistemic trust: A new conceptualization of borderline personality disorder and its 
psychosocial treatment. Journal of Personality Disorders, 29(5), 575-609. 
doi:10.1521/pedi.2015.29.5.575 
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., & Campbell, C. (2017a). What we have changed our 
minds about: Part 1. Borderline personality disorder as a limitation of resilience. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4, 11. 
doi:10.1186/s40479-017-0061-9 
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., & Campbell, C. (2017b). What we have changed our 
minds about: Part 2. Borderline personality disorder, epistemic trust and the 
developmental significance of social communication. Borderline Personality 
Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4, 9. doi:10.1186/s40479-017-0062-8 
Main, M., Kaplan, N., & Cassidy, J. (1985). Security in infancy, childhood, and adulthood: A 
move to the level of representation. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child 
Development, 50(1-2), 66-104. doi:10.2307/3333827 
Mansell, W. (2011). Core processes of psychopathology and recovery: "Does the Dodo bird 
effect have wings?". Clinical Psychology Review, 31(2), 189-192. 
doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2010.06.009 
Sperber, D., Clement, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., & Wilson, D. 
(2010). Epistemic vigilance. Mind & Language, 25(4), 359-393. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
0017.2010.01394.x 
Wilson, D., & Sperber, D. (2012). Meaning and relevance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
  
 
